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CFE Ruling Does Not Bind Legislature
By David Schoenbrod
We have all read the headlines: State Supreme Court Justice Leland DeGrasse, backed
by the state Court of Appeals, has ruled in the Campaign for Fiscal Equity case that an addi-
tional $14.8 billion must be spent on schools in New York City.
Most people assume that the New York State Legislature must come up with the mon-
ey. The assumption is understandable – courts are armed with the power of contempt,
which allows them to punish those who disobey their orders. The most prominent exam-
ple of court enforcement against defiant official concerned school desegregation in 1950s
and 60s. The massive resistance in the Southern states was overwhelmed by northern pub-
lic opinion, the defendants had to com-
ply, and their resistance is now rightly
viewed as shameful.
Against this background, I as a law-
yer would have read the headlines about
the CFE case the way that most people
read them—that the Legislature must
comply. But an experience in the mid-
1970s educated me otherwise. At that
time, Ross Sandler1 and I were the attor-
neys for the plaintiffs in a case to enforce
the clean-air plan for New York City.
From it issued a court order running
against the governor, the mayor, and
many other state and local officials, re-
quiring them to implement this clean-air
plan.2 One of the plan’s element was to institute tolls on the bridges over the Harlem and
East Rivers. Ross and I came to realize that the bridge-toll requirement was unenforceable.
The governor could not be held in contempt for not instituting the tolls because he lacked
under state law to do so. That authority could be granted only by the state Legislature.
However, the state Legislature could not be forced to grant that authority because it was
not a party to the case. If we tried to join the state Legislature as a party to the case, we
would not succeed because of the doctrine of legislative immunity.
Legislators are Immune
The plaintiffs in the CFE case face the same enforcement problem that Ross Sandler and
I faced in the bridge-toll case. The governor cannot be held in contempt for not providing
the money if the impediment is that the state Legislature has not appropriated the money.
Under the state constitution, only the Legislature can appropriate money. The legislators
cannot be made parties to the case because of legislative immunity. In other words, Justice
DeGrasse and the Court of Appeals cannot enforce their order against the state Legisla-
ture.
There are cases where legislators have had to knuckle under to court orders, but none
of them indicate that the courts in the CFE case can impose their will on the Legislature.
Perhaps the most apt parallel is the New Jersey school finance equalization case3. The high
court of New Jersey had found that there was a state constitutional requirement that school
districts across the state have equal budgets on a per-pupil basis. What the court had in
mind was that the districts spending less money would be raised up by the state Legislature,
3 The defendant in CFE is the
governor.
3 Only the Legislature can
appropriate money.
3 The Legislature is not and
cannot be a party to the case.
3 Therefore, the court’s order
cannot be enforced.
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If the judge tried to fine or
hold the state in contempt,
appellate courts would end
up holding the state immune.
so that all districts would be more or less equal. The
Legislature did not go along with this, because to come
up with the extra money required imposing a state
income tax and a bare majority of the state legislators
were against doing so. After a prolonged period when
the Legislature was not cooperating, the court ordered
that the schools be closed unless and until spending
was equalized. That prompted a few legislators to
change their position. A state income tax was enacted
in New Jersey and the order was more or less complied
with.
What made the tactic arguably legitimate in New
Jersey was that the right being enforced was to equal
spending. One way of equalizing spending is to raise
every district up to the same level. Another way of
equalizing spending is to spend nothing on any pu-
pil. The court could justify its order by pointing out
that its order directly vindicated the right (although
the Legislature could also do so in a more salubrious
fashion).
That kind of logic would not
work in the CFE case, because the
right at issue here is to a basic
education rather than equal
spending. If the court in New
York closes all the schools in New
York State, the court denies any
education to all students. The court would be violat-
ing the right at issue in the case rather than vindicat-
ing it. That would be illegitimate and would undercut
the only leg the court has to stand on, the rule of law.
Another case where a legislative body was made
to knuckle under had to do with public housing in
Yonkers. In that case, the court started to impose es-
calating fines on the city of Yonkers. In order to pay
the fines, the city had to cut its spending, garbage was
not collected, and people were being laid off. This
alienated the electorate. Eventually the city council
went along with the court.
Illusory Remedy
What allowed that tactic to succeed in Yonkers was
that the court could levy contempt fines on the city
for its disobedience. The court cannot fine the state in
the CFE case because the state is ultimately immune.
The state is titularly a party to the case.  But if Justice
DeGrasse tried to fine or hold the state in contempt,
appellate courts would end up holding the state im-
mune. There is a U.S. Supreme Court case from 19784,
which shows what would happen. The state in that
case was not coming up with the money to remedy
constitutional violations in its prisons and the trial
court made a move toward holding the state in con-
tempt. At that point, the United States Supreme
Court—a much more liberal Supreme Court than we
have today—held that the state could raise the im-
munity issue even though it had long been a party to
the case. The high court in CFE should hold that the
state is immune rather than fining it.
Would it be shameful in CFE for the state Legisla-
ture to take advantage of the court’s inability to force
it to act? The recollection of the massive resistance
episode in the South suggests that it might be.  Those
with a longer view of history might come to a differ-
ent conclusion about whether it is shameful for offi-
cials to disregard the decision of a court. Consider the
Supreme Court’s decision in the Dred Scott case that
African Americans cannot be full citizens of the Unit-
ed States. Abraham Lincoln, as a candidate for the U.S.
Senate, said that if elected to Congress, he would op-
pose the Dred Scott decision. Stephen Douglas, his
opponent in the election, said that it would be shame-
ful to disregard the Supreme Court. Lincoln countered
that if he were a named defendant
in a case, he would have to obey,
but as a legislator, he had his own
independent responsibility to in-
terpret the constitution and to
work for what he thought was the
proper interpretation of the con-
stitution. Lincoln’s point of view
justifies the state Legislature in the CFE coming up
with its own independent interpretation of the edu-
cation clause of the state constitution.
Majority vs. Minority Rights
Lincoln’s view makes sense today. It would not
prevent a court from striking down an unconstitution-
al statute; it would not prevent a court from issuing
an order against the governor or the mayor not to
implement an unconstitutional statute; and it would
not have prevented the courts from enforcing the
Brown v. Board of Education decree. The CFE case is
about majority rights rather than minority rights. It is
a right that inheres in all the schoolchildren in the state
and has potent political appeal.
Justice Degrasse’s opinion does make a difference,
not because the court can enforce it, but because most
people seem to think that the court can enforce it.  In
other words, it is a political fact.
But should the court’s order have any additional
bearing on what the Legislature does?
Putting aside my belief that the court should not
have entered this political fray in the first place, it
seems to me that if we do take Lincoln seriously, then
the court and the Legislature have to take a hard look
at the state constitution, and think about what it is
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doing with regard to the promise that a system of
education be provided. From that point of view, the
court’s decision that the New York City schools are
inadequate is an educational fact that cannot be
disputed. The Legislature should begin with the
premise that the schools in New York City are not good
enough. That does not mean, however, that the
Legislature has to buy the rather narrow-minded,
financially-focused solution that the court has
imposed.
Nothing in this paper is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Empire Center or of the Manhattan Institute, or as
an attempt to influence the passage, defeat, approval or disapproval of any legislation or other matter before the State Legislature,
the Governor, or any other state or local agency or official.
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